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INTRODUCTION
Of the various places to be judicially deprived of their private na-
ture, the most devastated is undoubtedly the automobile. What may
once have been viewed as a sanctuary more comforting in its limited
confines and mobility than the airy expanse of a family home has be-
come a place of public scrutiny, subject to nearly unchecked inva-
sions of its physical interior and the persons who occupy it.
For the most part, drivers have acquiesced in the searching police
inquiries that routinely accompany traffic stops. Maybe they believe
that these intrusions are the consequence of their own misconduct.
Maybe they realize that resistance to such practices was rendered fu-
tile long ago, when the omnipotent force of the public interest began
to chip away at their Fourth Amendment rights. Regardless of the
reason, however, their passengers must not fall victim to the same
passive resignation. The "right to be let alone"' should not be arbi-
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trarily disregarded because of one's presence in a vehicle stopped for
a traffic violation.
Because "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,,
2
the reasonableness requirement of that Amendment' extends to sei-
zures of passengers in traffic stops. Under Terrny v. Ohio, a seizure
must be reasonable both at its inception and throughout its duration,
meaning that any interaction between police and passengers must be
reasonably related to effectuating the purpose for the stop.4 Unfor-
tunately, however, courts have yet to develop a coherent means of de-
termining when these seizures are reasonable. Some have concluded
that passengers are not actually seized during a traffic stop, and that,
therefore, such encounters need not be reasonable. 5 These courts
view a passenger's detention as incidental to that of the driver,6 and
thus, as a consensual encounter.7
Other courts have determined that, although these encounters are
seizures," passenger questioning constitutes a reasonable police prac-
tice as a matter of law. Reasonableness balancing,9 these courts say,
weighs in favor of the police, who need to be able to identify wit-
Amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible items, but extends as well to the recording
of oral statements, overheard without any 'technical trespass .... '" (citation omitted)).
2 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
3 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... " U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). In Terry, an officer approached a man he believed to have been
"casing" a store for a robbery. After watching him pace back and forth up the street, occasion-
ally conferring with an associate, the officer stopped him and searched his person for weapons,
finding a revolver in his coat pocket. The Court determined that it was reasonable for an offi-
cer having specific reasons to suspect a person, although lacking probable cause, to initiate a
limited seizure and, if his suspicions include a belief that the individual is armed and danger-
ous, a weapons frisk. The opinion gave birth to the modern day investigative detention, the
requirements of which apply to traffic stops.
E.g., People v. Cartwright, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 788, 793 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) ("Passengers are
not seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment simply because they occupy a seat in a
vehicle which a police officer stops for a violation of the Vehicle Code."). But see People v. La-
mont, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 26, 31 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) ("[A]t the time of the initial traffic stop, the
passenger is seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.").
6 E.g., People v. Jackson, 39 P.3d 1174, 1185 (Colo. 2002) ("The stop of the passenger is
merely an unavoidable result of the driver's acquiescence in the police officer's command.");
State v. Hickman, 763 A.2d 330, 337 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) ("[T]he passengers are
subject, as a practical matter, to the same temporary stop as the driver....").
7 E.g.,Jackson, 39 P.3d at 1188 (holding that a police request for a passenger's identification
was a consensual encounter because a reasonable person would have felt free to decline the
request).
8 E.g., State v. Griffith, 2000 WI 72, 1 44, 613 N.W.2d 72, 81 ("[T]he officer's posing of...
questions to the passenger did involve some incremental intrusion on the passenger's personal
liberty.").
9 "[T]here is 'no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the
need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails.'" Terry, 392
U.S. at 21 (citation omitted).
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10 ... 11
nesses, verify information provided by the driver, orjust have more
information about the individuals they are dealing with." The inva-
sion of personal liberty these needs demand is thought to be mini-
mal.
1 3
Finally, a minority of courts view the questioning of a passenger as
an independent extension of that passenger's seizure, requiring an
independent justification. 4 Where the requisite reasonable suspicion
is lacking, the suppression remedy is available to repair the damage."
This Comment explores the reasonableness of encounters be-
tween police and passengers during traffic stops. Part I will discuss
Fourth Amendment doctrine as it is currently applied to the routine
traffic stop, with an emphasis on the requirements set forth by the
Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio.6 Part II will examine each of the
most common jurisprudential approaches to determining whether
the questioning of passengers during traffic stops is reasonable. This
Part will evaluate each approach in turn, reviewing the relevant deci-
sions to illustrate the common analytical errors that render each inef-
fectual. Part III will propose as an alternative a presumption of un-
reasonableness, to be countered only by either a clear showing of a
reasonable relation to an important public interest or independent
reasonable suspicion based on the totality of the circumstances of the
particular incident.
I E.g., State v. Jones, 5 P.3d 1012, 1018 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000) ("We hold the securing of
names of witnesses is part of the scope of a traffic stop.. . ."), aff'd on other grounds, 17 P.3d 359
(Kan. 2001); Griffith, 2000 WI 72, 48, 613 N.W.2d at 81 ("[T]here is a general public interest
in attempting to obtain identifying information from witnesses to police-citizen encounters.").
1 E.g., United States v. Brown, 345 F.3d 574, 578 (8th Cir. 2003) ("The officer may also ask
the passenger similar questions to verify the information the driver provided."); United States v.
Mendoza-Carrillo, 2000 DSD 34, 107 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (same).
12 E.g., State v. Landry, 588 So. 2d 345, 348 (La. 1991) ("[T]he officers had a further security
interest in determining whether the men with whom they were dealing were dangerous charac-
ters.").
13 E.g., id. ("[T]he document obtained by the simple request for identification was one
which is commonly used for identification purposes and one in which a person has little expec-
tation of privacy."). Despite this holding, it seems obvious that an individual may have more
than a little expectation of privacy in an identification card. This is because it is not the card
itself, but the information it contains-namely, the identity-which the individual may wish to
keep private.
14 E.g., United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that police questioning
of the occupants of a vehicle stopped for speeding about their travel plans was reasonable after
police developed a reasonable suspicion that they were involved in drug activity).
15 "[S]tatements given during a period of illegal detention are inadmissible even though
voluntarily given if they are the product of the illegal detention and not the result of an inde-
pendent act of free will." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501 (1983) (holding that police ex-
ceeded the limits of an investigative detention when they asked the defendant to accompany
them to a small police room after stopping him in an airport, retaining his ticket and identifica-
tion, and retrieving his luggage without consent).
16 392 U.S. 1 (1968); see supra note 4.
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I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE TRAFFIC STOP
Of the countless encounters between citizens and the police, per-
haps the most common is the dreaded traffic stop. Everyone knows
the sinking feeling in the pit of the stomach that accompanies flash-
ing lights in the rearview mirror. Perhaps the driver was speeding,
rolled through a stop sign, failed to signal, or neglected to replace a
broken taillight. Regardless of the reason, and although inevitably
unpleasant, these mild brushes with the law are often uneventful. An
officer approaches the driver, asks to inspect the necessary docu-
ments, issues a citation or a warning, and then departs, leaving the
offending motorist grumpy, but perhaps a bit more cautious.
Such an encounter constitutes a "seizure,"7 and must therefore be
reasonable to comply with the Fourth Amendment.18 Specifically, the
law classifies the routine traffic stop as an "investigative detention," or
"Terry stop."' 9 Police need only have a reasonable suspicion that some
illegality has occurred or is occurring in order to stop a vehicle to in-
. 20
vestigate. Importantly, however, police must be able to clearly ar-
ticulate the reasons for their suspicions,2' and the subsequent investi-
gation must be limited to whatever questions or other conduct is
necessary to determine if a violation has occurred.2
Sometimes the minor traffic stop gets more complicated. If police
suspicions are aroused by something they see or hear during the stop,
something unrelated to the initial traffic violation, they may want to
investigate further. Maybe the driver appears to be intoxicated, the
17 "[S] topping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a 'seizure' within the
meaning of [the Fourth Amendment], even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the
resulting detention quite brief." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979) (holding that a
discretionary stop of an automobile to check license and registration requires reasonable suspi-
cion).
is See supra note 3.
19 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984) ("[T]he usual traffic stop is more analo-
gous to a so-called 'Terry stop,' than to a formal arrest." (citations omitted)); accord United
States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262, 1266 (10th Cir. 2001) (same); United States v. Purcell, 236
F.3d 1274, 1277 (11th Cir. 2001) (same); State v. Mitchell, 960 P.2d 200, 202 (Kan. 1998)
(same); Damato v. State, 64 P.3d 700, 704 (Wyo. 2003) (same). The idiom is in reference to
Teny v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See supra note 4.
20 See Berkenmer, 468 U.S. at 439 ("Under the Fourth Amendment,... a policeman who lacks
probable cause but whose 'observations lead him reasonably to suspect' that a particular person
has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime, may detain that person briefly in
order to 'investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion.'" (citation omitted)). Typically,
police will have probable cause to make the stop based on their observation of a traffic viola-
tion, but such cause is not required.
2 Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 ("[I]n justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be
able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.").
Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439 ("[T]he stop and inquiry must be 'reasonably related in scope to
the justification for their initiation.'" (citations omitted)).
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interior of the car smells like marijuana, or a weapon is in plain view
on the back seat. In such cases, police may decide to question the
2 h 24 25driver, order him to exit the car, frisk him for weapons, or con-
duct a search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle.26
Although certainly more intrusive both in scope and duration,
these encounters are viewed as extensions of the initial investigative
detention. 2' Thus, their reasonableness is determined by the same
standards as the initial stop. The extension must be justified by an
independent reasonable suspicion of some additional illegality,28 and
the subsequent investigation must be limited in scope to that which is
reasonably related to determining whether that suspicion is correct.
29
Despite the clarity of these well-established principles, both the
orderly procedure of the traffic stop itseff and the law that attempts
to govern it fall into disarray when passengers are present. And when
passengers are required to shift roles from innocent bystanders to
witnesses, or even suspects, disarray becomes disaster. It would seem
that police questioning of passengers would pose no special problem
for courts. The expansion of the passenger's seizure is reasonable if
it is reasonably related to the purpose for the traffic stop or is based
upon an independent reasonable suspicion. Inexplicably, however,
23 See, e.g., United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that police question-
ing of the occupants of a vehicle stopped for speeding about their travel plans was reasonable
after police developed a suspicion that they were involved in drug activity).
24 Under Pennsylvania v. Mimns, police may order the driver of a vehicle stopped for a rou-
tine traffic violation to exit the automobile as a matter of course. 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977).
The Supreme Court in that case determined that the public interest in officer safety outweighs
the "de minimis" intrusion on driver privacy such that the practice is reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment as a matter of law. Id. In Maryland v. Wilson, the Court held that Mimms
applies to passengers as well. 519 U.S. 408 (1997).
25 The Terry Court explained the need for police officers to search for weapons:
[T] here must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons
for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing
with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to
arrest the individual for a crime.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.26
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983) ("[Tlhe search of the passenger compart-
ment of an automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is
permissible if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief.., that the suspect is dangerous
and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons.").
27 See Givan, 320 F.3d at 458 ("After a traffic stop that was justified at its inception, an officer
who develops a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity may expand the scope of an
inquiry beyond the reason for the stop and detain the vehicle and its occupants for further in-
vestigation.").
28 Id.
2 "[Plolice [should] diligently pursue[] a means of investigation that [is] likely to confirm
or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it [is] necessary to detain the defendant."
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985) (holding that a twenty-minute detention was
reasonable where drug enforcement agents were diligent in their investigation).
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courts have taken widely divergent routes in their efforts to deter-
mine reasonableness in this context.
II. COMMON APPROACHES TO DETERMINING WHETHER ENCOUNTERS
BETWEEN POLICE AND PASSENGERS ARE CONSTITUTIONAL
A. Consensual Encounter
The Fourth Amendment has no bearing on consensual encoun-
ters between police and citizens.30 A cop can approach anyone on the
street and ask him to list every single illegal thing he has ever done in
his life. If the unlucky target is foolish enough to answer, there is
nothing the Fourth Amendment can do to help him in court. Its
protection is limited to "searches and seizures."' Thus, unless and
until an encounter loses its consensual nature, it will not trigger
Fourth Amendment scrutiny. 2 Accordingly, the first question a court
must answer is whether and at what point a seizure of a passenger ac-
tually occurred.
Although the definition of a seizure has varying formulations, its
existence generally depends exclusively on the underlying police
conduct. In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court stated that "[ol]nly
when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has
in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a
'seizure' has occurred."3
In United States v. Mendenhall,34 the Court clarified the second half
of this definition, determining that a seizure is accomplished by a
show of authority "only if, in view of all of the circumstances sur-
rounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that
he was not free to leave." 35 The Court listed a variety of indicators,
including "the threatening presence of several officers, the display of
a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the
30 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983) ("If there is no detention-no seizure within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment-then no constitutional rights have been infringed.").
31 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
32 Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) (holding that consensual searches of bus pas-
sengers' luggage are not per se unconstitutional).
33 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968) (emphasis added); see supra note 4.
34 446 U.S. 544 (1980). In Mendenhal4 police suspected that a woman at an airport was car-
rying narcotics. After approaching her and asking to inspect her ticket and identification, they
noticed a discrepancy, questioned her briefly, and asked her to accompany them to an office.
There, they obtained consent to search her handbag and her person and discovered heroin.
The Court determined that she had not been seized within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, specifically noting that "stopping or diverting an automobile in transit, with the
attendant opportunity for a visual inspection of areas of the passenger compartment not other-
wise observable, is materially more intrusive than a question put to a passing pedestrian .... "
Id. at 556-57.
35 Id. at 554.
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citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that com-
pliance with the officer's request might be compelled."36
Because both cases involved encounters that occurred in the
open, the Court's conception of the seizure was not broad enough to
encompass less obvious seizures-those involving more mental,
rather than physical, compulsion. This problem was solved in Florida
v. Bostick 7 where the Court offered yet another formulation of the
seizure standard, one specifically intended to cover seizures taking
place in inherently confined locations.
In Bostick, police boarded a bus parked at a rest stop. In accor-
dance with a police program designed to uncover drug trafficking,
they eyed each passenger as they moved down the aisle, searching for
certain revealing characteristics. When they reached the rear, they
noticed the defendant, asked to see his ticket and identification, and
then requested consent to search his luggage. When he consented,
police discovered narcotics.
The defendant argued that a reasonable passenger would not
have felt free to leave the bus.38 He claimed that he had been seized
under Mendenhall, and that his consent to the search was therefore
involuntary.39 But the Court disagreed, reasoning that his inability to
leave was a product of his decision to take the bus in the first place.40
The appropriate test, the Court held, was whether the police conduct
would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person
was not "free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate
the encounter" based on the totality of the circumstances. 4'
Although the facts of Bostick are clearly distinguishable, the case
has been hugely influential to courts evaluating encounters taking
place during traffic stops. In addition to utilizing the Bostick inquiry
for whether a Fourth Amendment seizure occurred, courts regularly
cite the opinion for the rule that "mere police questioning does not
,,42constitute a seizure.
For example, in People v. Jackson,43 police stopped a car in the mid-
dle of the night because its headlights were not on. After approach-
w Id.
57 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
38 Id. at 435.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 436 ("Bostick's movements were 'confined' in a sense, but this was the natural result
of his decision to take the bus; it says nothing about whether or not the police conduct at issue
was coercive.").
41 Id. See generally Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion,
2002 SuP. Cr. REv. 153 (2003) (arguing for the use of empirical evidence in consent determina-
tions; concluding that the bus passengers in Bostick would have felt compelled to comply with
police even if they would have preferred to refuse).
42 Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434.
43 39 P.3d 1174 (Colo. 2002).
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ing the vehicle, the officer requested the necessary documents from
the driver and then asked for identification from the passenger.
When a computer check revealed outstanding warrants for the pas-
senger's arrest, he was taken to the police station, where a search of
his person revealed crack cocaine.
After citing Bostick for the appropriate inquiry,44 the Colorado Su-
preme Court determined that "[t]he stop of the passenger is merely
an unavoidable result of the driver's acquiescence in the police offi-
cer's command." 45 The request for identification, therefore, was not
a seizure but a consensual encounter. 6 The court reasoned that the
officer's tone of voice and non-threatening manner, among other
things, would have communicated to a reasonable person that he was
free to decline the request or otherwise terminate the encounter.
47
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin came to a similar conclusion in
State v. Griffith.48 In that case, police stopped a car on suspicion of
driving without a license and immediately questioned the driver and
both passengers as to their identities. The interrogation resulted in
the arrest of one passenger for providing false information. After
noting that "the passenger was already seized incidental to the lawful
stop of the [car]," the court cited Bostick5° before holding that the
questioning was consensual because the passengers could decline to
51answer.
These cases, and many others like them,5 construe the detention
of passengers in a traffic stop as merely incidental to that of the
driver. Because police suspicion is not directed at them, any subse-
quent encounter police initiate with passengers is looked upon as
consensual when it involves mere questioning, which automatically
fails the Bostick test.53 These courts regard such questioning as rele-
4 Id. at 1182.
45Id. at 1185.
46Id. at 1186.
47 Id. Interestingly, the court noted that its holding required it to "leave[] aside the inher-
ent social pressure citizens feel to cooperate with the police." Id.
4 2000 WI 72, 613 N.W.2d 72.
49 Id. 1 44, 613 N.W.2d at 81.
50 Id. 1 53, 613 N.W.2d at 82.
51 Id. 1 84, 613 N.W.2d at 65.
52 E.g., People v. Grant, 266 Cal. Rptr. 587, 592 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that no sepa-
rate detention of a passenger occurred when police stopped a car for speeding, and that a re-
quest for identification was a consensual encoonter); People v. O'Neal, 32 P.3d 533, 538 (Colo.
Ct. App. 2000) (holding that a police request for a passenger's identification was "part of a con-
sensual interview").
53 Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) (noting that "mere police questioning does
not constitute a seizure").
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vant only for its ability to extend the duration of the stop, which bears
exclusively on the reasonableness of the driver's seizure.
This line of reasoning is simply erroneous. It fails to recognize
that passengers are subjected to a seizure as soon as the car is pulled
over. Whether that seizure may be described as incidental is irrele-
vant. Passengers are forced to yield to police authority when the
driver does. As the California Court of Appeal explained in reversing
its previous practice of treating passenger involvement as consensual,
"[t]he freedom of action of the passenger, as well as the driver, is sig-
nificantly curtailed by an officer's act of making the driver stop the
car."56 Any subsequent questioning, therefore, should be examined
not independently, but for its bearing on the reasonableness of that
passenger's seizure.
A comparison between Bostick and an ordinary traffic stop is illus-
trative. In Bostick, police boarded the bus without any suspicion of its
occupants whatsoever for the purpose of conducting a random drug
sweep.5 7 They had no particular passenger in mind and no evidence
of wrongdoing.5 8 Accordingly, unless the passengers harbored guilty
consciences, most of them probably felt little other than mild curios-
ity as to what or who the cops were looking for. The bus did not be-
See United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 436 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that consensual
questioning of a passenger about matters unrelated to the initial justification for the stop is un-
reasonable only where it extends the duration of the detention); State v. Hickman, 763 A.2d
330, 338 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) (holding that police may question passengers about
any unrelated matters so long as it does not extend the duration of the stop).
55 "[Sltopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a 'seizure' within the
meaning of [the Fourth Amendment]." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979) (holding
that a discretionary stop of an automobile to check license and registration requires reasonable
suspicion) (emphasis added); see People v. Lamont, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 26, 31 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004)
("[A]t the time of the initial traffic stop, the passenger is seized within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment."). Contra People v. Cartwright, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 788, 793 (Cal. Ct. App.
1999) (holding that passengers are not subjected to any seizure when the cars in which they are
riding are stopped by police, reasoning that only the driver has submitted to the authority of
the police); State v. Mennegar, 787 P.2d 1347 (Wash. 1990) (en banc) (holding that there had
been no seizure of a passenger prior to the time police discovered the existence of an out-
standing warrant by running a computer check on his identification).
56 Lamont, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 31. In Lamont, the California Court of Appeal determined that
.a traffic stop constitutes at least a momentary seizure of everyone in the car," effectively over-
ruling its 1999 decision to the contrary in Cartwright, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 793. The court rea-
soned:
The freedom of action of the passenger, as well as the driver, is significantly curtailed by
an officer's act of making the driver stop the car. Whether a passenger remains detained
thereafter depends on whether, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would
feel free to leave. Presumably, if the officer is investigating the driver, the passenger is
free to walk away. The same cannot be said if the officer immediately approaches and
questions the passenger.
Lamont, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 31.
57 Bostick, 501 U.S. at 431.
5 Id.
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long to them, they probably did not know any of the other passen-
gers, and they certainly had no reason to think they were being tar-
geted. Therefore, when police took an interest in the defendant, he
had not yet been seized. The defendant, like the other passengers,
was merely sitting on the bus waiting to continue his journey. The
encounter with police did not begin until he was questioned.
The seizure in a traffic stop, on the other hand, begins at the
moment the driver submits to police authority by pulling over, not
whenever the officer takes an interest in the passengers. As soon as
the overhead lights begin to flash and the sirens begin to wail, the
driver knows the police have reason to suspect him of wrongdoing.
The passengers are aware of that suspicion, and of their proximity to
it. In this situation, the police are not stopping a person. They are
stopping an automobile that may contain any number of people.
Each of the occupants knows that his conduct, composure, and ap-
pearance will be carefully scrutinized.
One can think of the occupants of the bus in Bostick as patrons of
a restaurant, similarly confined to a relatively small physical location
and yet entirely independent of one another as to motivations and
intentions. Passengers in an automobile can be thought of as occu-
pants of one table in that restaurant, even more closely confined and
sharing motivations and intentions as to their presence in the restau-
rant.
In this sense, passengers are passive participants in any detention
of the driver. It is this participation that makes it a seizure. Their
mere presence has the potential to affect the outcome of the deten-
tion. Such involvement negates the possibility that passengers would
feel free to simply get out of the car and walk away. Not only would
that course of action appear highly, suspicious, it would, in all likeli-
hood, be prevented by the police." Instead, passengers must remain
where they are throughout the duration of the detention. And be-
cause the duration is determined by the officer, passengers have no
power to terminate the encounter. 6°
59 The Supreme Court has upheld a variety of police practices on the ground that their
minimal intrusion on privacy rights is outweighed by the public interest in officer safety. See
Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997) (extending the Mimms rule to passengers); Pennsyl-
vania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (holding that police may routinely order a driver from his
vehicle as a means of ensuring their safety). Accordingly, it can be assumed that requiring pas-
sengers to stay within sight of police during a traffic stop would similarly be deemed a reason-
able means of ensuring their safety. Although the Court expressly declined to decide this ques-
tion in Wilson, 519 U.S. at 415 n.3, it made the broad pronouncement in Mimms that "[w]hat is
at most a mere inconvenience cannot prevail when balanced against legitimate concerns for the
officer's safety," 434 U.S. at 111.
60 The Court of Appeals of New Mexico recently explained it well:
A passenger in a vehicle stopped because of a traffic-related violation is situated in a ve-
hicle that is not free to be driven away and is not free to drive the vehicle away....
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As a result, it defies logic to suggest that questioning during such a
seizure is a consensual encounter. It is much like arguing that a kid-
napping victim can consent to a subsequent sexual assault. The en-
tire theory of the consensual encounter is that the subject has not
been seized, and therefore, his freedom of choice is unimpaired by
perceived police authority.6' After being detained by police with
flashing overhead lights and sirens, a passenger confined to the scene
cannot realistically be thought to consider himself free to decline to
answer when questioned by a standing, uniformed, armed police offi-
cer.6" Maintaining that this encounter is the product of some implied
consent on the part of the passenger is a fiction of judicial imagina-
61tion.
If mere questioning cannot itself constitute a seizure of a passen-
ger, as the Supreme Court held in Bostick,64 then it cannot possibly be
sufficient to transform the initial seizure into a consensual encounter.
Questioning does not signal the end of one encounter and the be-
ginning of another. Rather, questioning is an aspect of the continu-
ing seizure of the passenger, bearing on its reasonableness.
By relying on the illusion that passengers can simply ignore the
presence of the police, courts approve the sort of fishing expeditions
the Fourth Amendment was designed to prevent. If questioning is
consensual, there is no limit to the range of questions police may ask
In reality, few passengers in this circumstance would, in our view, feel free to ignore
an officer's request for identification, or feel free to get out of the vehicle and leave the
area after either refusing to give the information or even after providing it. Nor, in our
view, would an officer likely tolerate a passenger's refusal to give the information fol-
lowed by the passenger leaving the area ....
We doubt that passengers generally ... would want to risk the consequences they
would fear from their refusal to provide identifying information, or from providing the
information and then leaving the area.
State v. Affsprung, 87 P.3d 1088, 1093-94 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004) (citations omitted).
61 An investigative detention, on the other hand, does impair that freedom. Although those
questioned technically retain the right to refuse to answer, the coercive nature of the encounter
is what makes it a seizure, subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amend-
ment.
62 "There is simply all the difference in the world in the nature of the relationship between a
police officer detaining someone for questioning and a police officer striking up a conversation
on the bus." United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 960 (7th Cir. 2002) (Cudahy, J., concurring)
(holding that police may question passengers about matters unrelated to the purpose for the
stop so long as they do not significantly prolong the detention), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 829
(2002).
Again, the Court of Appeals of New Mexico is enlightening:
We think it strains common sense to say a passenger under the[se] circumstances.., can
feel free to ignore such direct police privacy int-usion. We think it more fiction than fact
to call this encounter consensual. We know of no legal or policy purpose or effect that
requires or invites an encounter such as this to be called consensual. That the passenger
voluntarily provides information at the officer's request does not turn the encounter into
a consensual one.
Affsprung, 87 P.3d at 1094.
501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991).
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passengers, regardless of the impact their answers may have on every-
one present. In this way, police can interrogate passengers with im-
punity, develop reasonable suspicion, and then interrogate the driver
about matters unrelated to the traffic stop, which would otherwise
violate Terry.65 Under this approach, the fewer reasons police have to
suspect wrongdoing of a person in a traffic stop, the more they may
take advantage of an inherently coercive environment to blindly dig
for evidence of unrelated crimes they have no reason to believe have
even occurred. This cannot be what the Fourth Amendment was in-
tended to allow.
B. Reasonable as a Matter of Law
Courts recognizing that passengers truly are seized by police dur-
ing a traffic stop must determine whether their seizure was reason-
able. In Tery, the Court framed the inquiry as a dual one: "whether
the officer's action was justified at its inception, and whether it was
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the
interference in the first place."66
In the absence of individualized suspicion, courts must balance
the law enforcement interests in the particular practice against the
interests of the individuals affected by it to determine if the first
prong was met. If the balance justifies the intrusion, Terry still re-quires that it be limited in both duration and scope.68 Specifically,
An investigative detention must be "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances
which justified the interference in the first place." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968); see supra
note 4.
6 Id.
67 Id. at 21 ("[T]here is 'no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balanc-
ing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails.'"
(citations omitted)).
Disagreement exists among the federal circuit courts as to whether the second prong of
the Terry inquiry pertains solely to duration or contains a substantive limitation as well. Compare,
e.g., United States v. Shabazz, 93 F.2d 431, 437 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that passenger question-
ing unrelated to the purpose for the stop was reasonable because it did not extend the duration
of the stop), with United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1230 (10th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (hold-
ing that the reasonableness of a traffic stop must be judged by examining its duration and the
manner in which it is carried out). Although this conflict persists, language from the Supreme
Court's opinion in F/orida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), tends to support the view that Terry
stops be limited in scope as well as duration. Specifically, the Court stated that "the investigative
methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel
the officer's suspicion in a short period of time." Id. at 500; see also Amy L. Vazquez, Comment,
"Do You Have Any Drugs, Weapons, or Dead Bodies in Your Car?" What Questions Can a Police Officer
Ask During a Traffic Stop?, 76 TUL. L. REv. 211, 228 (2001) (arguing that suspicion should be re-
quired for any unrelated questioning during a traffic stop).
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"an investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer
than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop."
69
The Court has had numerous occasions to perform reasonable-
ness balancing when examining the constitutionality of police road-
blocks. In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, for example, the Court ap-
proved suspicionless stops of automobiles near the Mexican border to
check drivers' licenses and registrations.70  The Court held that the
public interest in border control outweighed the minimal intrusion
on Fourth Amendment liberty.71 In Indianapolis v. Edmond, however,
the Court determined that a generalized interest in crime control was
insufficient to outweigh Fourth Amendment liberty.72 Thus, stopping
cars to check for drug activity requires independent reasonable suspi-
73cion.
In the routine traffic stop context, the initial seizure of passengers
is reasonable because it is unavoidable. The public interest in stop-
ping the driver far outweighs the minimal intrusion on passengers'
liberty. Their inconvenience is justified by the public interest in
highway safety.74 Thus, the first prong of the Tery inquiry can be pre-
sumed to be met. Subsequent questioning of passengers, therefore,
is an aspect of the second prong; it must be reasonably related to fur-
thering the purpose of the stop.
Many courts appear not to have grasped this distinction. They
begin their analyses by asking whether some public interest justifies
police questioning of passengers in general, as though such question-
ing constitutes the seizure's inception. For example, in State v. Grif-
fith, police approached a car that had stopped in an apartment
building parking lot on suspicion that the driver did not have a valid
69 Royer, 460 U.S. at 500 (holding that police exceeded the bounds of an investigative deten-
tion when they asked the defendant to accompany them to a small police room after stopping
him in an airport, retaining his ticket and identification, and retrieving his luggage without
consent).
70 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
71 Id. at 557 ("[T]he need to make routine checkpoint stops is great, [and] the consequent
intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests is quite limited.").
72 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000) ("We cannot sanction stops justified only by the generalized and
ever-present possibility that interrogation and inspection may reveal that any given motorist has
committed some crime.").
73 Id. ("We decline to suspend the usual requirement of individualized suspicion where the
police seek to employ a checkpoint primarily for the ordinary enterprise of investigating
crimes.").
74 Of course, the stop of the car must be based on a reasonable suspicion that a driver has
committed a traffic violation. In Terry, the Court determined that such suspicion, along with
the corresponding public interest in preventing crime, outweighs individual Fourth Amend-
ment rights. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The Court applied this holding to traffic stops in United States
v. Brignoni-Ponce, where it held that police having a reasonable suspicion that a vehicle contains
illegal aliens may stop the car and briefly investigate. 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975). As a result of
these holdings, reasonable suspicion is a per sejustification for an investigative detention.
75 2000 WI 72, 613 N.W.2d 72.
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license. The officers immediately questioned the driver and both
passengers as to their identities, resulting in the arrest of one passen-
ger for providing false information.
After noting that "the passenger was already seized incidental to9, 76
the lawful stop of the [car]," the Supreme Court of Wisconsin con-
cluded that "the public interests are substantial and the interference
with private liberty interests is de minimis.",77 Therefore, "the incre-
mental intrusion that resulted from the questioning did not trans-
form the lawful, reasonable seizure into an unlawful, unreasonable
one." 78
According to the court, such questioning served police interests in
completing the investigation of the traffic violation, determining the
fate of the automobile,8 0 and identifying witnesses to the encounter. 1
As will be explored in greater detail below, the court failed to con-
sider whether these interests were reasonable under the circum-
stances and whether police conduct was calculated to further them.
In fact, the court never even inquired as to whether the police actu-
ally had these interests to begin with.
Clearly, there are occasions when these interests constitute impor-
tant police objectives. Sometimes police need to speak to passengers
to determine whether a violation has occurred, to verify information,
or to ensure their own safety. But, as discussed above, the reason-
ableness of passenger questioning is an aspect of the second prong of
the Terry inquiry, not the first. Courts may not simply conclude that
asserted police interests generally outweigh passenger liberty and call
it a day. Rather, when passenger questioning is alleged to have fur-
76 Id. 44, 613 N.W.2d at 81.
7 Id. 63, 613 N.W.2d at 84.
78 Id. 63 n.13, 613 N.W.2d at 84 n.13.
Id. 1 46, 613 N.W.2d at 81. The court reasoned that, although the driver of the vehicle
had admitted to having lost his driver's license, his response was "ambiguous," such that police
"may have wished to obtain information from the rear passenger to complete the investiga-
tion .... " Id. (emphasis added).
80 Id. The court stated only that "it seems reasonable under the circumstances that [police]
would seek some additional information, such as whether anyone in the car was licensed to
drive." Id.
81 Id.; accord State v.Jones, 5 P.3d 1012, 1018 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000) ("We hold the securing of
names of witnesses is part of the scope of a traffic stop .... ."), affid on other grounds, 17 P.3d 359
(Kan. 2001). Other courts have relied on police interests in verifying the information provided
by the driver, see, e.g., United States v. Brown, 345 F.3d 574, 578 (8th Cir. 2003) ("Once the of-
ficer makes the traffic stop, the officer may lawfully... ask the driver about his destination and
purpose .... The officer may also ask the passenger similar questions to verify the information
the driver provided."); United States v. Mendoza-Carrillo, 2000 DSD 34, 15, 107 F. Supp. 2d
1098, 1102 (same), and in determining whether individuals in the vehicle are dangerous, see,
e.g., State v. Landry, 588 So. 2d 345, 348 (La. 1991) ("When the officers ordered defendant and
the driver from the car in order to establish a face-to-face situation, the officers had a further
security interest in determining whether the men with whom they were dealing were dangerous
characters.").
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thered one of the above interests, the inquiry as to whether it com-
plied with the second prong is twofold: first, whether the interest it-
self was reasonably related to the purpose for the stop, and second,
whether the questioning that occurred was reasonably related to fur-
thering that interest.
82
As for the first part, the interests discussed above cannot reasona-
bly be said to exist in every single traffic stop. Unlike the broad in-
terests served by border checks and random bus sweeps, these inter-
ests do not exist independent of the facts and circumstances of a
particular encounter. If a warning is to be given, identifying witnesses
is unnecessary. If the stop was premised on probable cause, for ex-
ample police observation of a traffic violation, there is no investiga-
tion to be made. And if a car is occupied by a young mother and her
children, there simply is no reason for police to feel threatened.
Thus, the facts of the particular case must support the conclusion that
the interest was related to the purpose for the particular stop, that it
83was one any reasonable officer would have had in that situation.
If found so related, courts must then examine the actual question-
ing that occurred. Reality must be respected. Questions about drugs
and weapons are not reasonably related to identifying witnesses, to
determining the fate of automobiles, or to completing the investiga-
tion of a traffic violation. Identification is simply unnecessary when
police question a passenger to verify information provided by a
driver.
In State v. Affsprung,8 4 the Court of Appeals of New Mexico per-
formed precisely the correct analysis. There, police stopped a vehicle
for a faulty license plate light. Although the officer admittedly had
no suspicion that either the passenger or the driver were engaged in
criminal activity or were dangerous in any way, the officer requested
identification from them both and then ran a warrants check on
82 Teny itself supports this interpretation of the second prong. After discussing the applica-
ble standards in that case, the Court specifically examined "the conduct of [the officer] ... to
determine whether his search and seizure of petitioner were reasonable, both at their inception
and as conducted." 392 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1968). After acknowledging the legitimacy of officer
safety as a public concern, the Court concluded that "on the facts and circumstances [he] de-
tailed before the trial judge a reasonably prudent man would have been warranted in believing
petitioner was armed and thus presented a threat to the officer's safety while he was investigat-
ing his suspicious behavior." Id. at 28. Thus, the details of the particular encounter had to sub-
stantiate the state's claimed public interest. Then, the Court was careful to compare the offi-
cer's conduct to its justification, concluding that he had "confined his search strictly to what was
minimally necessary to learn whether the men were armed and to disarm them once he discov-
ered the weapons." Id. at 30.
83 See id. at 21-22 ("[I]n making that assessment it is imperative that the facts be judged
against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the sei-
zure or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was
appropriate?").
84 87 P.3d 1088 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004).
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them. After learning that the passenger was wanted on an out-
standing warrant, the officer performed a search incident to arrest
and discovered drug paraphernalia. According to the officer, it was
his standard practice to perform such checks on all occupants of
stopped vehicles as a means of ensuring his own safety.
Although "sensitive to the generalized concern an officer may
have regarding potential harm to them from the friction that can
flow from a traffic stop,""5 the court was adamant in its disbelief that
"this generalized concern, without more, is sufficient to override rea-
sonable Fourth Amendment privacy considerations of passengers in
relation to routine traffic misdemeanor stops."' According to the
court, "[w]ith no suspicion, much less reasonable suspicion, regard-
ing criminal activity on the part of Defendant, and no particularized
concern about his safety, the officer had no legitimate basis on which
to obtain the identifying information for the purpose of checking it
out through a wants and warrants check."
87
Unfortunately, many courts have failed to understand the Terry
inquiry in this context. Instead, they employ categorical, public in-
terest justifications in such a way that inquiry into the particular event
becomes unnecessary. Essentially, these courts conclude that police
questioning of any passenger is presumptively reasonable as long as it
is alleged to have been related to one of the above police interests.
This allegation is not required to be supported by the facts and cir-
cumstances; if police say they had a reason for doing it, it was reason-
able. The second half of the Terry inquiry essentially drops out with
respect to passengers, leaving the reasonableness of their seizure to
depend only upon whether police had the requisite suspicion to stop
the driver.
The problem is illustrated well by the following decisions. In
United States v. Carrasco,ss police stopped a car for speeding and dis-
covered that the driver's license was suspended. When the driver re-
quested that her passenger be permitted to drive the car home, po-
lice questioned the passenger about his identity, address, travel plans,
and whether he was carrying weapons. The interrogation culminated
in a pat-down that revealed drugs. The District Court for the District
of New Mexico concluded, without explanation, that "questions rea-
sonably related to the purpose of a traffic stop are permissible and do
not constitute an illegal detention." 9 Apparently, asking whether the
85 Id. at 1094.
86 Id. at 1094-95.
87 Id. at 1094.
88 236 F. Supp. 2d 1283 (D.N.M. 2002).
89 Id. at 1287.
[Vol. 7:41086
"PEOPLE, NOT PLACES"
passenger had weapons was relevant to whether he would be able to
drive the car home.
In United States v. Rivera,90 police stopped a car for tailgating and
questioned both the driver and the passenger about their identities,
travel plans, and ownership of the vehicle. Without elaborating, the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit stated only that the officer
"could legitimatel, ask [such] questions. .. regardless of [his] under-
lying motivation."' In so holding, the court assumed that the chal-
lenged conduct was meant to serve some legitimate, but unstated, po-
lice interest, even when the officer himself had not so alleged.
Similarly, in State v. Griffith,92 the case discussed at the beginning
of this section, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin determined that a
variety of public interests justified police questioning of a passenger
without once evaluating whether such interests were objectively rea-
sonable under the circumstances of the stop or how the actual ques-
tioning furthered those interests.93 Instead, the court found only that
such interests exist during traffic stops generally. 4 The obvious im-
plication was that they existed during the relevant encounter, render-
ing it reasonable, but the court failed to account for this finding. In
this way, the court justified police conduct itself, instead of requiring
the state to do so, in accordance with its burden of proof.
95
If the objective reasonableness of such interests in a particular
case and the relationship of the questions asked to those interests are
irrelevant, then the questioning of passengers would seem to be pre-
sumptively reasonable in all cases. After all, a court could conclude
that an officer questioned a passenger for any one of the interests
given above, regardless of the facts and circumstances of the particu-
lar stop. The Fourth Amendment does not grant this blanket author-
ity to question passengers. "A central concern in balancing these
competing considerations ... has been to assure that an individual's
reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject to arbitrar7 invasions• ,96
solely at the unfettered discretion of officers in the field."9 The only
way to obtain such assurance is to strictly adhere to the commands of
Terry.
90 867 F.2d 1261 (10th Cir. 1989).
91 Id. at 1263.
92 2000 WI 72, 613 N.W.2d 72.
95 See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
94 For example, the court stated that "there is a general public interest in attempting to ob-
tain identifying information from witnesses to police-citizen encounters." Griffith, 2000 WI 72,
48, 613 N.W.2d at 81.
95 "It is the State's burden to demonstrate that the seizure it seeks to justify... was suffi-
ciently limited in scope and duration to satisfy the conditions of an investigative seizure." Flor-
ida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).
96 Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979) (holding that police did not have the requisite rea-
sonable suspicion to detain the defendant on the street for questioning).
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In Giffith,97 therefore, the court should have determined how
identifying the passenger was relevant to determining whether the
driver was licensed. As a dissenting judge noted, "[t]here is no testi-
mony whatsoever in the record supporting the majority's theory that
the questions directed at [the passenger] were asked to further the
investigation. In the absence of testimony to support its theory, the
majority nevertheless imputes such motivation to the officers.
98
The same criticism may be levied against the other justifications
given by the court for the questioning of the passenger in that case.
For example, the court found only that "[t] here is a public interest in
determining whether a car must be towed at public expense or may
be driven away by a private party."9 Instead, the court should have
determined first, whether it was objectively reasonable to require the
car to be moved at all, and second, how identifying the passenger was
reasonably related to the fate of the vehicle. Because "there [was]
nothing to suggest that the car needed to be removed from its loca-
tion, ' '  and "the officers never expressed an intent to inquire
whether [the passenger] had a valid license so that he could drive the
[car] out of the driveway,"1°' this inquiry would have made very plain
that the justifiability of the questioning was questionable. In truth, it
was vital to determining the reasonableness of the passenger's sei-
zure.
That court also found that "there is a general public interest in at-
tempting to obtain identifying information from witnesses to police-
citizen encounters."02 Instead, the court should have determined
first, whether it was objectively reasonable to believe such informa-
tion was necessary in that particular case, and if so, whether identifying
the passenger immediately-prior to the police determination of
whether the suspected violation had even occurred-was reasonably
related to that interest. Again, the court did not do so.0
Other police interests said to justify the questioning of passengers
should be handled similarly. If verification of information provided
by a driver is cited as the justification, the court should determine
why such verification was necessary in a particular case and whether
9' 2000 WI 72, 613 N.W.2d 72.
98 Id. 91, 613 N.W.2d at 88 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
99 Id. 47, 613 N.W.2d at 81.
100 Id. 1 93, 613 N.W.2d at 88 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
101 Id.
102 Id. 48, 613 N.W.2d at 81.
103 Accordingly, as the dissent concluded, "the actual record is devoid of any reference to
legitimate law enforcement objectives or public interest concerns to justify the intrusion upon
[the passenger's] right to privacy." Id. 90, 613 N.W.2d at 88 (Bradley, J., dissenting). There-
fore, "[w]eighing the unexpressed public interest against [the passenger's] interest in personal
security tips the scale in favor of [his] right to be free from arbitrary interference by law en-
forcement under these particular facts." Id. 98, 613 N.W.2d at 89.
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the questions posed were reasonably calculated to accomplish such
verification. Ideally, police would be required to show reasonable
suspicion that the driver was providing false information before veri-
fication would be deemed to outweigh individual Fourth Amendment
rights.
If officer safety is cited, the court should determine whether a
concern for the officer's safety was objectively reasonable under the
circumstances and how identifying or questioning passengers pro-
moted that interest. This is particularly true because the Supreme
Court has granted police the option of removing passengers from ve-
hicles,10 4 and even frisking them, when a safety concern arises.W
5
Again, ideally, police would be required to show a reasonable suspi-
cion that passengers posed a threat before the public interest in offi-
cer safety would be deemed to outweigh passengers' individual
Fourth Amendment rights.
Whatever the particular interest provided as the justification,
none is sufficient to warrant an intrusion on the privacy and liberty of
innocent passengers unless police conduct is shown to be objectively
reasonable in a particular case. This requires courts to evaluate the
encounter to determine what objectives would have been reasonable
to police at the time and what conduct would have been reasonably
related to furthering those objectives. Otherwise, such questioning
takes advantage of the unavoidable presence of the passengers,
"whose only transgression is their presence in vehicles stopped for
traffic violations."'
As with any driver, unjustifiable questioning of a passenger makes
a justifiable detention unreasonable. The failure to complete the
Terry inquiry after conducting reasonableness balancing results in a
disparity between the treatment accorded to drivers and that ac-
corded to passengers. Such passengers become second-class citizens,
whose constitutional right to be free from intrusive police inquiry is
nullified by the presumed existence of some broad police interest,
rather than being protected by the individualized justifications re-
quired in the searches and seizures of drivers.""
104 See Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997) (holding that the public interest in officer
safety permits police to order passengers from vehicles lawfully stopped for traffic violations as a
matter of course). See generally Skyler J. Greco, Note, Just Along for the Ride: The Tribulations of
Maryland v. Wilson, 34 TULSA L.J. 625, 626 (1999) (arguing that Wilson represents an "erosion"
of Fourth Amendment liberties).
105 See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (holding that police had reasonable
suspicion to frisk a driver who was ordered to exit his vehicle after the officer noticed a bulge in
his jacket); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968) (declaring a frisk where an officer was
understandably concerned about the safety of himself and others "reasonable").
106 Griffith, 2000 WI 72, 100, 613 N.W.2d at 89 (BradleyJ, dissenting).
107 As one commentator has argued, "[p]assengers no longer have a diminished expectation
of privacy when they travel in an automobile, but rather no expectation of privacy at all."
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If police are assured of a justification for their action, one that
does not require consideration of the particular questioning that oc-
curred, they may become more inclined to expand the scope of ques-
tioning beyond that which would be reasonable to accomplish the
presumed purposes. This in turn may lead to the divulging of infor-
mation that might compromise not just the questioned passenger's
privacy rights, but those of other occupants as well. These courts
sanction a form of inquisitorial justice that demeans the protections
granted by the Constitution, "open[ing] a door to the type of indis-
criminate, oppressive, fearsome authoritarian practices and tactics of
those in power that the Fourth Amendment was designed to pro-
hibit."0
0 8
C. Individualized Suspicion
As with the driver, if police develop a reasonable suspicion that a
passenger has committed or is committing a crime during a traffic
stop, they may expand the stop to investigate further.' As with any
other seizure, investigative detentions based on reasonable suspicion
must meet the requirements of Terry. Accordingly, the additional in-
trusion into the rights of a seized passenger must be 'Justified at its
inception" °10 and must be "reasonably related in scope to the circum-
stances which justified the interference in the first place."''.
Much has been written by the Supreme Court in reference to the
meaning of these requirements. As for the first prong, courts must
determine whether objective reasonable suspicion existed in a par-
ticular case based on the "totality of the circumstances.". 2  Impor-
tantly, an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch"' is in-
Ronald L. Hanna, Casenote, Scope of Automobile Search Extends to Passengers' Belongings--Erosion
Control or Controlled Erosion?: Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999), 25 S. ILL. U. LJ. 419,
438 (2001) (arguing that Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding automobile searches has
gradually broadened police power at the expense of Fourth Amendment privacy rights).
108 State v. Affsprung, 87 P.3d 1088, 1095 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004).
109 It is important to recognize the distinction between questioning said to be related to the
purpose for the original traffic stop and that based on independent reasonable suspicion aris-
ing during the stop. The former is an aspect of the continuing seizure, justified at its inception
by police suspicion of a traffic violation. The latter is an aspect of the expanded seizure,justi-
fied at the point of expansion by some additional reasonable suspicion, unrelated to the pur-
pose for the stop. See supra note 71 And accompanying text.
10 Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
III Id.
12 When making reasonable suspicion determinations, courts "must look at the 'totality of
the circumstances' of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a 'particularized and
objective basis' for suspecting legal wrongdoing." United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273
(2002) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981)) (holding that a border
patrol agent had reasonable suspicion to detain a minivan traveling on a remote unpaved road
near the border).
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sufficient.1 '3 Police must "be able to point to specific and articulable
facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant the intrusion."
4
As for the second prong, "[t]he scope of the detention must be
carefully tailored to its underlying justification."" 5 In other words,
the seizure must be "temporary and last no longer than is necessary
to effectuate the purpose of the stop."" 6 Additionally, "the investiga-
tive method employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably
available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of
time.""l7
Because courts have been unable to resist the temptation to find
other means of holding the questioning of passengers to be reason-
able, cases in which independent reasonable suspicion was required
are few. Collectively, however, they indicate that the reasonable sus-
picion standard provides little more protection to passengers than ei-
ther of the alternative approaches discussed above. The fault lies not
in the standard itself, but rather in the judiciary's almost unwavering
deference to police determinations of whether it has been satisfied.
11F
Because of their presumed experience and their presence at the
scene, police are deemed to possess a far greater ability to assess the
implications of particular facts and circumstances than a court relying
on testimony weeks or months after the stop. This deference has re-
sulted in numerous decisions finding reasonable suspicion to exist on
facts and circumstances that were objectively innocent, even in their
totality, and clearly inferior to the activity contemplated by the Su-
preme Court in Terry." 9
In United States v. Givan,12 0 for example, the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit determined that reasonable suspicion of drug activ-
ity existed to support the questioning of passengers about their travel
plans where police knew only that a visibly "nervous and fidgety"
21
13 Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
" Id. at 21.
115 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).
116 Id.
117 Id.
18 See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985) (holding that courts "should take
care to consider whether the police are acting in a swiftly developing situation, and in such
cases the court[s] should not indulge in unrealistic second-guessing"); see also United States v.
Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) ("[The reasonable suspicion standard] allows officers to draw
on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions
about the cumulative information available to them that 'might well elude an untrained per-
son.'" (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981))); United States v. McRae, 81
F.3d 1528, 1534 (10th Cir. 1996) ("We defer to the ability of a trained law enforcement officer
to distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions." (citations omitted)).
19 See supra note 4.
120 320 F.3d 452 (3d Cir. 2003).
121 Id. at 459.
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driver was speeding westbound in Pennsylvania in a rental car ob-
tained in Michigan less than twenty-four hours prior to the stop. The
court stated that reasonable suspicion "only requires that police ar-
ticulate some minimal, objective justification"1 22 and should be deter-
mined "in light of the officer's experience.' 23
In United States v. Galindo-Gonzales,2 4 the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit determined that questioning passengers about their
identities was reasonably related to determining ownership of a vehi-
cle when its driver was unable to produce proper registration.
25
When a subsequent computer check revealed that the vehicle was in
fact registered to the driver, the court held that continued question-
ing of the passengers was reasonable where the initial questioning
gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that the passengers were illegal
immigrants. 12 6  The court thought this suspicion reasonable, even
though it was based exclusively on the facts that the passengers spoke
only Spanish and carried no identification, and that the driver re-
fused to disclose their identities.
27
It must be noted that there are cases rejecting police contentions
that reasonable suspicion existed. However, the facts and circum-
stances of those cases clearly precluded an alternative result. For ex-
ample, in State v. Larson,'28 police approached a car illegally parked
beside a public park at 3 a.m. When the police got closer to the vehi-
cle, it began to pull away and the police turned on their overhead
lights and stopped it. After being asked for identification, one pas-
senger opened her purse, into which an officer shone his flashlight.
The light revealed marijuana and the passenger was arrested. The
Supreme Court of Washington held that the justification for the
stop-a parking violation-did not "reasonably provide an officer
with grounds to require identification of individuals in the car other
than the driver, unless other circumstances give the police independ-
ent cause to question passengers.' 1 9 Such cause, the court deter-
mined, did not exist here.' 0
12 Id. at 458 (emphasis added).
123 Id.
14 142 F.3d 1217 (10th Cir. 1998).
125 Id. at 1223.
126 Id. at 1225.
127 Id.
128 611 P.2d 771 (Wash. 1980) (en banc).
1 Id. at 774. "To hold otherwise," the court continued, "would restrict the Fourth Amend-
ment rights of passengers beyond the perimeters of existing case law." Id.
130 Id. ("When considered in totality... the circumstances known to the officers at the
time ... did not give rise to a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the occupants were en-
gaged or had engaged in criminal conduct, but at best amounted to nothing more substantial
than an inarticulate hunch." (citation omitted)).
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Similarly, in State v. Damm,l'3 police stopped a car for a broken tail-
light and immediately demanded identification from every occupant
of the vehicle. A computer check revealed an outstanding warrant on
one of the passengers, resulting in his arrest and the discovery of
drugs in the vehicle. The Supreme Court of Kansas held that the of-
ficer had no reasonable suspicion to require identification from the
passengers, which impermissibly prolonged the detention of the
driver. 2 The court reasoned that:
Otherwise, the driver of a carload of people on the way to work, the
driver of a vanload of people on the way to a ball game, or the driver of
an intercity bus loaded with passengers, when stopped for a defective tail-
light, could be detained for an inordinate amount of time while the offi-
cer runs record checks on every passenger aboard! 3
Because these decisions were based on egregious police conduct,
they do nothing to alter the conclusion that genuine disputes as to
what may be reasonably inferred as suspicious from a particular situa-
tion are resolved in favor of the police. If facts or circumstances were
thought suspicious by the particular officer at the time of the stop,
the court will find reasonable suspicion to have existed if he can
point to anything on which to base his conclusion, regardless of
whether it was objectively reasonable or not.
This tiebreaker method of answering an important legal question
fails to uphold the strict requirements of Tery. The Supreme Court
was crystal clear that "the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful
only when.., the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws
can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge
who must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or sei-
zure in light of the particular circumstances. X This statement, along
with the Court's "demand for specificity in the information upon
which police action is predicated,"135 requires courts to conduct inde-
pendent evaluations of the facts and circumstances to determine
whether reasonable suspicion truly existed.
36
1 787 P.2d 1185 (Kan. 1990).
132 Id. at 1188. With respect to the rights of the passengers, the court noted that "each indi-
vidual is clothed with constitutional protection against an unreasonable seizure, which may not
be denied by the individual's mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal
activity." Id. at 1189 (citation omitted).
13s Id. at 1188; see also United States v. Mendoza-Carrillo, 2000 DSD 34, 107 F. Supp. 2d 1098
(holding that a failure to make eye contact, an ambiguous remark, and the driver's inability to
remember his passenger's last name did not constitute reasonable suspicion to question the
passenger after the officer had finished writing a warning for a defective taillight).
Terryv. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
135 Id. at 21 n.18.
136 The Court stressed the importance of neutrality and independence in determining
Fourth Amendment protections in Johnson v. United States when it noted:
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By instead granting deference to law enforcement officers, courts
have entirely removed all objectivity from the review. Noble inten-
tions notwithstanding, those with such profound interests in a par-
ticular result are simply not fit to make objective determinations re-
specting a constitutional right. The practice is analogous to trusting
the Pope to uphold the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution.
3 7
Furthermore, because reasonable suspicion is a matter of law, po-
lice officers are not in a position to make such determinations-most,
particularly those who patrol the streets, are paid for their muscle,
their bravery, and their enthusiasm for nabbing the bad guy. Street
cops are not required to understand the intricacies of Fourth
Amendment doctrine. Viewed in this light, the abdication of judicial
authority through deference to police appears even more absurd.
The right to be free from governmental intrusion must not fall so
easily to the biased discretion of overzealous police officers and their
paranoid determinations of what constitutes reasonable suspicion. As
the Court has recognized, "[t]he needs of law enforcement stand in
constant tension with the Constitution's protections of the individual
against certain exercises of official power. It is precisely the predict-
ability of these pressures that counsels a resolute loyalty to constitu-
tional safeguards."
38
III. A PROPOSAL FOR A PRESUMPTION OF UNREASONABLENESS
The combined result of these principles is that a passenger's
rights will be successfully vindicated only where police are unable to
articulate any conceivable reason for their action. The myriad of op-
tions held to be sufficient by the judiciary makes this unlikely. Police
can testify to their own benevolent respect for the passenger's sup-
posed freedom of choice by demonstrating how pleasant, gentle, and
otherwise not coercive their behavior was. In a credibility contest, the
word of a public servant is likely to prevail against that of a presumed
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers,
is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reason-
able men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences
be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.
333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948). This case concerned the warrantless search of a hotel room, but the
statement is nonetheless germane. Because it would be illogical to expect police to obtain a
warrant prior to making a traffic stop, the subsequent review of its basis by an objective judiciary
is even more essential.
137 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of relig-
ion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... .").
138 Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973) (holding that a warrantless
search of an automobile without probable cause or consent at a location twenty-five miles from
the border was not the functional equivalent of a border search and, therefore, was unreason-
able).
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criminal. Police can also invoke any of the various public interest
buzz words, including the omnipotent "police safety," which inevita-
bly prevails against what is perceived to be an inconvenience. 39 Fi-
nally, police can describe how their infallible nose for criminals was
once again accurate. Deference to police determinations makes the
basis for the suspicion almost irrelevant because, as courts like to
point out, the untrained layperson would not pick up the scent.
Burdened by these so-called justifications, Fourth Amendment
reasonableness has withered to Fourth Amendment routine. Yet no
matter how routine such practices may have become, these practices'
harm to the people's right to be let alone is undeniable. There is no
such thing as a consensual encounter during a traffic stop. Vague
public interests cannot be called upon to justify constitutional viola-
tions without support from the facts and circumstances. And police
are paid to be suspicious, not reasonable, which negates any conten-
tion that their judgment is objective. In short, reform of the current
jurisprudential nightmare is required.
If the Fourth Amendment truly does protect people,' 4° it ought to
protect them uniformly, without reference to their company. Each of
the above three methods of analysis ignores the fact that there would
be no case against the passenger were it not for the unlawful conduct
of the driver. There is simply nothing reasonable about a doctrine
that proceeds from the assumption that dumb luck must favor the
government, rather than the citizenry. Nothing in the Constitution
supports this imbalance. If anything, the Fourth Amendment makes
clear that it is the rights of the people, not the self-endowed preroga-
tives of the state, which are to be accorded preference. 41
Accordingly, courts need a new standard, a new method of deter-
mining whether police questioning of passengers in traffic stops is
reasonable. If the injustices that result from current standards are to
be relieved at all, such questioning must be presumed unreasonable
from the start. The prosecution could rebut this presumption either
by showing that the specifics of a passenger's involvement in the traf-
fic stop bore a reasonable relation to an important public interest
139 E.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977) (holding that police may routinely
order drivers from their vehicles because the public interest in officer safety outweighs a mere
inconvenience); United States v. Enslin, 327 F.3d 788, 797 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a po-
lice order that a defendant show his hands was a reasonable seizure because the public interest
in officer safety outweighs a mere inconvenience), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 917 (2003); United
States v. Stanfield, 109 F.3d 976, 982 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that police may routinely open
vehicle doors when window tint obscures their vision because individual liberty interests are
.comparatively minor" in relation to the public interest in officer safety).
140 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) ("For the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places.").
141 U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. ... ").
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arising out of the particular incident, or by demonstrating the exis-
tence of independent, objectively reasonable suspicion of the passen-
ger. The court must decide for itself whether either showing has
been made based upon the totality of the circumstances of the stop in
question.
The presumption of unreasonableness remedies many of the cur-
rent problems. First of all, it comports with reality by precluding any
erroneous suggestion that police questioning of passengers is consen-
sual, and therefore, not subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny. It
recognizes such questioning for what it is-an aspect of the passen-
ger's initial seizure bearing on its reasonableness.
Secondly, the presumption places the interests at stake in their
proper order of priority. Constitutional protections must come be-
fore grandiose conceptions of the public interest, even if that interest
is the apprehension of criminals. The document itself makes this
clear, declaring itself and laws made pursuant to its authority to be
"the supreme Law of the Land.' 42
Under the prevailing analysis, once one of the tenuous justifica-
tions is even mentioned by the state, the burden of reasonableness is
for all intents and purposes shifted to the defendant to refute it. The
task is not easy, particularly when courts defer to police determina-
tions and even take it upon themselves to argue on the state's behalf.
In this way, courts imply that the public good should and will prevail
over any individual right to be let alone by the government. The ef-
fect is to stamp the involvement of passengers with a presumption of
reasonableness.
The opposite presumption would require the state to defend itself
from the beginning, as is its burden, by recognizing that such con-
duct is not the norm and should not be sanctioned absent special jus-
tification. As with alleged violations of the Due Process 143 and Equal
Protection'4 4 Clauses, the presumption of unreasonableness would
approximate an enhanced level of scrutiny, appropriate in this con-
text because police questioning of passengers burdens their constitu-
tional "right to be let alone.' 4 5  The presumption would require
courts to restrict the current bounds of reasonableness. When rea-
sonable suspicion is alleged as a justification, courts should be wary of
142 U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
143 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law.").
1 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.").
145 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (holding
that speech is not property within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and that the inter-
cepting of telephone conversations implicated the Amendment only if it was accomplished
through governmental trespass upon the suspect's property).
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deferring judgment to the police, which inevitably results in some
sacrifice of Fourth Amendment rights to the imagined necessity of
crime control. When the public good is alleged, courts should care-
fully determine whether the state interest truly existed and whether it
was really furthered by passenger questioning, being mindful of the
fact that a constitutional right is at stake. In this way, the questioning
of passengers would be placed alongside warrantless searches on the
hierarchy of Fourth Amendment police practices-simply stated,
unlawful until proven otherwise.146
Finally, the presumption would create uniformity in an area of the
law characterized by a vast uncertainty of outcome. Every such en-
counter would be judged by the same standard, whether its propriety
were being challenged by the defendant or not. If police are unable
to show either the requisite reasonable suspicion or that their action
was reasonably related to a sufficiently important state interest, the
presumption would prevail and the questioning would make the sei-
zure unreasonable.
Apart from these doctrinal improvements, the presumption would
serve an even more important purpose. It would help to secure the
rights of the people against routine abuses. Because police making
any given traffic stop are never certain of what might occur, they
would proceed with caution, knowing that any decision to involve a
passenger will require some meaningful justification if it leads to
prosecution. This would help to discourage unnecessary passenger
involvement, and consequently, flimsy arguments that police conduct
served an obscure public interest or that reasonable suspicion was a
matter of instinct.
Furthermore, over time police would learn the level of justifica-
tion that would be required by courts and would modify their actions
accordingly. The important public interests and the types of events
in which they legitimately arise would come to be distinguished from
those that do not warrant an invasion of privacy rights. Facts induc-
ing inarticulable suspicions would come to be set apart from those
that objectively give rise to a belief that criminal activity is afoot. Law
enforcement would thus gain a clear understanding of when they
would be warranted in conducting such questioning, and when they
would have to walk away, reducing the incidence of violations that do
not result in prosecution, as well as those that do.
146 "[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few spe-
cifically established and well-delineated exceptions." United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 357
(1967) (holding that the warrantless recording of a conversation from outside a public tele-
phone booth was an unreasonable search); accord Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750 (1984)
(holding that a warrantless entry into the home absent exigent circumstances is presumptively
unreasonable).
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CONCLUSION
The theory that the Fourth Amendment protects property rights
suffered its first major blow when Justice Brandeis wrote his dissent-
ing opinion in Olmstead v. United States. Arguing that government
wire taps on telephone lines constituted a search within the meaning
of the Amendment, Brandeis was adamant in his view that the Fram-
ers of the Constitution meant to protect, "as against the Government,
the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men. 147  As a result, Brandeis con-
cluded, "every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the
privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be
deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.' 148 Decades later, in
Katz v. United States, Justice Stewart proclaimed the necessary conclu-
sion that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places," 49 in
an opinion that found the government's surreptitious, warrantless re-
cording of conversations from outside a public telephone booth un-
constitutional.
Despite these broad pronouncements, Fourth Amendment pri-
vacy rights have largely been subordinated to the justifications prof-
fered for any given governmental intrusion, 150 even though such in-
terests are found nowhere in the Constitution. Additionally,
although individuals clearly harbor expectations of privacy in the
contents of their minds, 5' the reasonableness of seizures of intangible
information has been left to inferior notions of public interest, suspi-
cion, and implied consent, rather than the probable cause required
for most searches.
These developments have enormous implications for individuals
who are seized by prying police officers simply because of their pres-
ence in an automobile. Not realizing that they would be within their
147 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis,J., dissenting).
148 Id.
149 389 U.S. at 351.
150 For example, the presence of exigent circumstances exempts some searches from the war-
rant requirement. Such circumstances include the imminent destruction of evidence, a threat
to the safety of police or others, and the hot pursuit of a suspected criminal. Where found, exi-
gent circumstances allow police to dispense with a warrant regardless of the place invaded, in-
cluding the home. See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (holding that the war-
rantless search of a house for a suspected robber and weapons was reasonable where the crime
had just occurred and police had reason to believe he had entered the house).
151 AsJustice Brandeis eloquently opined:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit
of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings
and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of
life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs,
their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis,J, dissenting).
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rights to remain absolutely silent, passengers feel compelled to an-
swer questions, implicating themselves or others in an encounter
later deemed reasonable by some distant judge.
Such questioning and the demanding of identification is as much
an invasion of privacy as the emptying of a passenger's pockets. And
yet, courts considering the issue have upheld such conduct as consti-
tutional with very few exceptions, determining that crime control, po-
lice safety, and even administrative convenience justify the intrusion.
As demonstrated above, their analyses vary greatly, but they are uni-
form in their creation of what amounts to a secondary class of citi-
zens, whose right to be let alone by the government is reduced to a
fiction. Its protection has been subsumed by a fallacious formulation
of consent, deemed inconsequential by a socialist notion of public
welfare, and ultimately, left to flounder in the hands of the very gov-
ernment it was intended to limit.
Again, Justice Brandeis's dissent in Olmstead is instructive.
"Clauses guaranteeing to the individual protection against specific
abuses of power, must have a... capacity of adaptation to a changing
world."152 Thus, although the exploitation of passengers by police
during traffic stops was probably neither anticipated nor intended by
the Supreme Court when it began to adopt a liberal construction of
the Fourth Amendment, it can and should be rectified through re-
form.
Ultimately, that reform must include a presumption of unreason-
ableness, the only meaningful way to ensure that the right to be let
alone regains substance with respect to passengers in vehicles
stopped for traffic violations. Otherwise, "[rlights declared in words
might be lost in reality."0
53
152 Id. at 472.
153 Id. at 473 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910)).
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